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Abstract
Ramsey famously condemned discounting “future enjoyments” as “ethically indefen-
sible”. Suppes enunciated an equity criterion which, when social choice is utilitarian,
implies giving equal weight to all individuals’ utilities. By contrast, Arrow (Con-
temporary economic issues. International Economic Association Series. Palgrave
Macmillan, London, 1999a; Discounting and Intergenerational Effects, Resources for
the Future Press, Washington DC, 1999b) accepted, perhaps reluctantly, what he called
Koopmans’ (Econometrica 28(2):287–309, 1960) “strong argument” implying that no
equitable preference ordering exists for a sufficiently unrestricted domain of infinite
utility streams. Here we derive an equitable utilitarian objective for a finite population
based on a version of the Vickrey–Harsanyi original position, where there is an equal
probability of becoming each person. For a potentially infinite population facing an
exogenous stochastic process of extinction, an equitable extinction biased original
position requires equal conditional probabilities, given that the individual’s gener-
ation survives the extinction process. Such a position is well-defined if and only if
survival probabilities decline fast enough for the expected total number of individuals
who can ever live to be finite. Then, provided that each individual’s utility is bounded
both above and below, maximizing expected “extinction discounted” total utility—as
advocated, inter alia, by the Stern Review on climate change—provides a coherent
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and dynamically consistent equitable objective, even when the population size of each
generation can be chosen.
1 Introduction
1.1 The discounting issue: weighting future generations
The question of whether and how to discount the welfare of future generations has
played a critical role in discussing the ethical and economic foundations of long-
run policy analysis. This is especially true in the case of climate change which, if
managed badly enough, could even accelerate the possibility of human extinction.
Indeed, how much to discount the welfare of future generations was a particular, and
a particularly contentious, issue addressed by Arrow (1999a, b) himself. In those two
largely overlapping articles, he attributed to Koopmans (1960) two arguments in favour
of discounting the welfare of future generations. The first “strong” argument, set out
also by Koopmans et al. (1964) as well as by Diamond (1965) on his own, was that,
without giving less weight to utilities far in the future, no complete and transitive
preference ordering on the entire space of infinite utility streams could satisfy the
usual continuity and weak Pareto conditions.1 The second “weak” argument was that
failure to discount later generations’ utilities would imply that earlier generations are
condemned to make excessive sacrifices.
Among many subsequent discussions of this discounting issue, two that clearly
drew Arrow’s attention were Chichilnisky (1996), cited in Arrow (1999a, b), and then
the Stern Review (Stern 2007), reviewed in Arrow (2007). Indeed, it seems quite likely
that carefully and attentively reading the Stern Review led KA to have some doubts
about his own earlier articles.2 This helps explain why he appeared so keen to make
discounting the subject of one-on-one discussions with one of us (PH) over at at least
two lunches at Stanford during the approximate period 2014–2015.3
1.2 Fundamental utilitarianism
The paper we present here follows many others in addressing the discounting issue by
applying modern ideas of social choice theory with interpersonal comparisons, some
of which Arrow (1977) himself approved in the early years. Inspired by Adam Smith’s
Theory of Moral Sentiments, we consider an “impartial spectator” who uses conse-
1 Peter Diamond kindly prompted us to recall that Koopmans (1960, p. 287) had the “utility function” of
an “individual consumer” as his primary concern. When considering optimal growth, Koopmans (1965,
1967) does consider the case when the utility of future generations is discounted.
2 From now on we frequently refer to Kenneth Arrow and the three authors of this paper using a pair of
initials—i.e., KA, GC, PH and NS.
3 During these discussions PH remained unaware of Arrow (1999a, b), whose existence KA was too modest
to mention. But it was clear that KA had been inspired by his late friend Tjalling Koopmans, who had been a
mentor during his time at the Cowles Foundation when it was still in Chicago. It is also said that Koopmans
had persuaded KA and Gérard Debreu to amalgamate their separate working papers into what became
Arrow and Debreu’s (1954) classic paper on existence of general competitive equilibrium.
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quentialist decision theory (Hammond 1996, 1998) to contemplate how to navigate
arbitrary finite decision trees when the consequences belong to a domain of complete
lifetime histories of everything that should be relevant to decisions affecting a sin-
gle individual. In particular, we follow Kolm (1994) but contradict Broome (1993)
in asserting that any “cause of preference” which is ethically relevant should be an
“object of preference” included in the consequence domain of all ethically relevant
lifetime histories.
When contemplating decisions affecting a whole society, we imagine a “social
benefactor”. This benefactor’s concern is with consequence lotteries which emerge
from a significant modification of Rawls’ (1971) original position, behind a veil of
ignorance. Specifically, we avoid extreme risk aversion assumed by Rawls, which was
brought out in Harsanyi (1975) and Hammond (1975). Instead we follow both Vick-
rey (1945) and Harsanyi (1953, 1955) in assuming that a lottery determines, in effect,
which individual in society the benefactor will become, and so whose personal conse-
quence is relevant ex post, after this lottery has been resolved. Harsanyi in particular
postulates an “ethical observer” who acts as if there were an equal chance of becoming
any named individual upon emerging from what we will call the “Vickrey–Harsanyi”
original position. Treating all potential individuals equally in this way accords with
the concept of equity due to Suppes (1966) and applied to social choice theory by
Sen (1970, Chapter 9*), then by Hammond PJ (1976, 1979) and many successors. In
this setting, consequentialist rationality implies that the impartial benefactor should
maximize the average expected utility over the entire population. With an infinite set
of future generations, however, this equal chance lottery is not even well defined.
That is one reason why the strong argument for discounting that Arrow attributes to
Koopmans seems so persuasive.
1.3 Extinction discounting
In this social choice context, in order to escape the iron logic of Koopmans’ strong
argument, we recognize some relevant physical reality, and the ultimate inevitability
of mass extinction. This may occur due to the astrophysics of the sun, whose energy
releases will gradually intensify beyond a level consistent with continued life on Earth.
Also, though the likelihood of a devastating asteroid impact may ultimately be reduced
by human ingenuity, it is unlikely ever to be eliminated entirely. Finally, there is the
possibility of a mass extinction event due to a supervolcano on Earth, or to an intense
gamma-ray burst from a source close enough to be within our Milky Way galaxy.
Accordingly we postulate that the possibility of such events together determine a
background hazard process whose outcome is a risky extinction date beyond which
human life will be impossible. We treat this process as exogenous, in the sense that
any human action will have a negligible effect on the hazard rates behind it.
Our main result concerns the effect of “extinction discounting”, which is when
this background process is used to determine what discount factor should apply to
each future generation’s utility levels. This accords with the ideas of Sidgwick (1907),
Ramsey (1931), Mirrlees (1967) and Dasgupta and Heal (1979), as well as Stern (2007,
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2008, 2014a, b, 2015).4 Specifically, we give three conditions that are jointly sufficient
for an “extinction discounted” sum of future generations’ utilities to give a well-defined
Bergson social welfare function whose expected value should be maximized. These
sufficient conditions are:
1. following Arrow (1951, 1965, 1971), as well as Blackwell and Girshick (1954)
and Hammond (1998), the fundamental utility function that the impartial spectator
and benefactor applies to any individual’s personal consequences is bounded both
above and below;
2. any individual who never exists is assigned a unique specific utility level that is
normalized to zero;
3. attention is restricted to a restricted domain of intergenerational consequence
streams for which the background extinction process is fast enough, and the rate of
population growth slow enough, to ensure that with extinction discounting applied
to the size of each generation, the expected total discounted population is finite
and uniformly bounded.
Moreover, as discussed in Dasgupta and Heal (1979, ch. 9), the utilitarian objective
with extinction discounting that we consider can be derived from an intergenerational
variation of the Vickrey–Harsanyi original position.5 In this variation, rather than each
individual having the same probability of being selected, each has the same conditional
probability given the event that their generation comes into existence early enough to
survive the random background extinction process.6
1.4 Outline
The remainder of the paper begins with some brief recapitulations of key ideas. First,
Section 2 recalls the key distinction between discounting the utility as opposed to
the consumption of individuals in future generations. It also sets out Arrow’s (1999a;
1999b) reasons for claiming that the utilities of future generations should be dis-
counted.
Next, Section 3 discusses how “consequentialized” ethics can be combined with
consequentialized decision theory to make a case for an impartial spectator/benefactor
to maximize the expected value any fundamental von Neumann–Morgenstern utility
function in a unique cardinal equivalence class, defined on an appropriate domain of
personal consequences. Moreover, following ideas that Kolm (1972, 1998) ascribes to
Tinbergen (1957), this fundamental utility function, including its domain, should be the
4 Here we note the influence of James Mirrlees, whose Ph.D. dissertation on optimal growth (Mirrlees 1963),
contrary to some accounts, had KA as an active external examiner rather than supervisor. In Cambridge
during the late 1960s co-authors PH and NS learned about exponential discounting from Mirrlees, who was
their and Dasgupta’s Ph.D. supervisor, while also providing Heal with valued informal advice.
5 Dasgupta and Heal point out that an intergenerational extension of the Vickrey–Harsanyi original position
had already been discussed by Rawls (1971, pp. 287–8), though without any mention of possible extinction.
We note that Dasgupta and Heal’s analysis considers generations of individuals who live for only one period.
It also precludes generations of different sizes, which may also be endogenous because they can be affected
by policy choices, including those that increase the endogenous risk of extinction.
6 See Ord (2020) for an alternative philosophical analysis that, inter alia, also supports extinction dis-
counting.
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same for all individuals. Finally, to allow for individuals whose potential existence is
precluded by extinction, this domain should include a personal consequence associated
with non-existence.
Section 4 extends the decision analysis of Sect. 3 to a society of finitely many
individuals. To do so, it introduces a generalization of the even chance lottery that
arises in the Vickrey–Harsanyi original position. Any generalized lottery reduces a
multi-person decision problem to one with a single lottery. In the case of an even
chance lottery, this can be regarded as decision-making by an impartial benefactor
who abides by the Suppes equity principle.
With infinitely many potential individuals, the even chance lottery that the impartial
benefactor uses in an Vickrey–Harsanyi original position becomes logically inco-
herent. Section 5 introduces a more structured model with an infinite sequence of
generations, each with a finite population, as well as a background extinction process.
Then we consider an “extinction biased” original position that equates individuals’
conditional probabilities of being selected, given the event that they belong to a gener-
ation that comes into existence early enough to survive the random extinction process.
These equated conditional probabilities exist if and only if the expected total number
of individuals in all generations that survive the stochastic extinction process is finite.
Then, provided we apply Arrow’s boundedness assumption to the fundamental utility
function, the corresponding expected utility of an extinction biased benefactor is an
absolutely convergent sum. So expected utility maximization for this benefactor is
well defined, and is equivalent to applying extinction discounting to each generation’s
total utility.
Next, Section 6 considers Chichilnisky’s (1996) objection that any welfare criterion
based on discounted utility must involve a “dictatorship of the present”. A mixed
criterion is proposed, fulfilling Chichilnisky’s definition of sustainable preferences by
avoiding not only a dictatorship of the present, but also a dictatorship of the future.
The last main Sect. 7 extends our results to the important case when we the set
of individuals belonging to each successive generation is treated as an endogenous
variable that is affected by policy choices. The extinction discounted expected util-
ity objective of Sect. 5 can still be applied on a restricted domain with exogenous
population bounds on the population of each generation. This objective, however, is
equivalent to maximizing the expectation of the extinction discounted total utility of
all generations. The objective is well defined, independently of the population bounds,
on the restricted domain of generation structures for which the extinction discounted
total population exists and is uniformly bounded.
Finally, Sect. 8 offers some concluding discussion.
2 Discounting what?
2.1 The social rate of discount for future consumption
It is important to distinguish discounting future consumption from discounting future
utility. Following what has become standard practice since at least Arrow and Kurz
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(1970) as well as Stern (1977), Section 3 of Arrow (1999a) gives the formula r = ρ+θg
for the social rate of discount to be applied to future consumption, where: 7
ρ is the of pure time preference (if any), θ is the elasticity of marginal utility with
respect to income, and g is the of growth of consumption per capita …ρ = 0
implies equal treatment of present and future.
Thereafter Sect. 4 of Arrow (1999a) starts as follows:
In [the] formula [r = ρ + θg], the second term, θg, is, I think, fairly uncon-
troversial. If future individuals are going to be better off than we are, then our
willingness to sacrifice on their behalf is certainly reduced. It would require a
greater rate of return to justify our depriving ourselves of consumption.
But the presence of pure time preference, denoted by ρ, has been very contro-
versial. The English economists, in particular, have tended to be very scornful
of pure time preference.
In the ensuing discussion of the term θg, Arrow (1999a) considers how to value an
increment in a good in the future, relative to an increment now. This is the discount
factor, which we denote by β, for that good at that time. In the continuous time model
that Arrow uses, the proportionate rate of decrease of the discount factor is given by
−β˙/β = − ddt ln β. It is the discount rate for that good at that time; it clearly depends
on both the good and the time. In our view, the focus in economic assessments should
be on the discount factor, as that is the key shadow price, relative to now, which is
needed to find the marginal present value of any change in costs or benefits occurring at
any specific time in the future. When we need to evaluate a stream of costs and benefits
over time, we can consider the net present value (NPV) of the whole stream, with the
costs and benefits at each time t weighted by the discount factor β(t). That is, at time 0
one considers NPV :=
∫ T
0 β(t) b(t) dt , where b(t) denotes net benefit at time t , and T
denotes the terminal time. When allowing for the inevitable uncertainty surrounding
future costs and benefits, one approach is to consider their expected discounted value.
Once we have the right concept of the discount factor that should be applied to
future consumption, it becomes immediately clear that this factor will depend on the
state of affairs at each relevant time in the future. Unmanaged climate change could
make future generations very poor. Then we might place a very high value on extra
goods that are available in calamitous circumstances. This could even imply negative
discounting, or equivalently, a discount factor greater than one. This possibility also
makes it clear that each uncertain future state of the world that could occur is of critical
relevance. So, too, is the person or persons who may experience increments in income.
Indeed, using the term “the discount rate”, as if there is just one given rate, clearly
constitutes a serious misunderstanding of the basic issues.
So the relevant discount rates in any calculation of expected discounted value are
endogenously determined as a result of our planned decisions. Moreover, this endo-
geneity is potentially severe in the case of climate change. After all, if unmanaged
7 This is sometimes described as the “Ramsey equation”. Yet the closest analogy in Ramsey (1928) seems
to be Eq. (9) on p. 554, which however involves the elasticity of utility rather than of marginal utility.
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climate change causes devastation and deep poverty in the future, that suggests we
should weight future consumption higher than present consumption, which implies
negative discounting.
2.2 Discounting the welfare of future generations
Our concern in this paper, however, is much more with the ρ term of the formula
r = ρ + θg that Arrow (1999a) gives for the discount rate. This is often called pure
time discounting, or pure time preference. It arises when we contemplate policies
whose effects, like the climate change induced by greenhouse gas emissions, extend
far into the future. This should force us to give some value to the consumption of
people who live in the future. Pure time discounting involves, and is even essentially
defined as, the relative weight attached to a life in the future compared to a life now,
when the two lives are otherwise identical in all respects. That is, the only difference
is that one life is in the future, whereas the other is right now.
If the pure time discount rate were 2% per annum, for example, then a life starting
35 years in the future that is otherwise identical to a life that starts now, would have
a relative value of 1.02−35 ≈ 0.5 compared to a life that starts now. In this sense we
are “discounting future lives”, which is effectively discriminating by date of birth. It
cannot be justified by some notion of the future life being better because it has higher
consumption; that would be discounting future consumption, as considered in Sect.
2.1, as opposed to discounting future welfare per se. We emphasize that we are making
an ethical comparison between two lives that are identical, except for the dates of birth.
It is very difficult to find serious ethical arguments for the kind of discrimination that
is involved in giving less weight to future generations’ well-being. Indeed, Dasgupta
and Heal (1979, p. 262) remind us of a highly relevant passage from Sidgwick (1907,
p. 414):
“How far we are to consider the interests of posterity when they seem to conflict
with those of existing human beings? It seems …clear that the time at which a
man exists cannot affect the value of his happiness from a universal point of view;
and that the interests of posterity must concern a Utilitarian as much as those of
his contemporaries, except in so far as the effect of his actions on posterity—and
even the existence of human beings to be affected—must necessarily be more
uncertain.”
In his celebrated paper on optimal saving, Ramsey (1928, p. 261) famously started out
by following the spirit of Sidgwick when he refused to discount the welfare of future
generations:
One point should perhaps be emphasised more particularly; it is assumed that
we do not discount later enjoyments in comparison with earlier ones, a prac-
tice which is ethically indefensible and arises merely from the weakness of the
imagination.8
8 The latter part of the paper “no longer reckon[s] future utilities and disutilities as equal to present ones,
but discount[s] them at a constant rate ρ.” (Ramsey 1928, p. 553).
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Arrow (1999b) not only quotes this passage from Ramsey, but also adds two later
quotes from other English economists. The first is from Pigou (1932, p. 25) stating
that pure time preference “implies …our telescopic faculty is defective.” The second
is Harrod’s (1948, p. 40) claim that “[P]ure time preference [is] a polite expression for
rapacity and the conquest of reason by passion.”9
2.3 Discounting our own future
When individuals contemplate their own future consumption, a discussion of how to
discount it very like that in Sect. 2.1 might easily arise. On the other hand, if the same
individuals contemplate their own future standard of living, there may be a closer
parallel with Sect. 2.2. For example, an individual saving for retirement might want to
discount future income somewhat if there is no longer any need to cover the expense
of travelling to work, or of being able to live very close to work.
Such discounting of our own futures is quite different from what concerns us here.
We are examining the ethical issue of whether there is any justification for discounting
a life simply and only on the grounds that it starts later. It is not clear why the impatience
of an individual who may value the future less than the present should be at all relevant
to ethics. The fact some people are sometimes impatient in their own decisions does
not tell us that there is any moral justification for discriminating between different
people just because some are born decades later than others.
At this point it may be worth reminding the reader that market prices and interest
rates, or rates of return, are very unlikely to give us ethical evaluations of the kind
needed to guide society toward good decisions. Instead, they describe facts concerning
the outcomes (equilibrium or otherwise) of the individual choices of many market par-
ticipants. Indeed, market interest rates typically do not even give ethically appropriate
individual marginal valuations, especially given the many interrelated imperfections
that seem inevitable in capital markets—as argued, for example, in Hammond (1992).
Looking at market rates is rarely an ethically defensible route to the social evaluations
that are necessary here.
Note, however, that just as mortality is one reason for discounting our own futures,
so the possibility of human extinction is a reason for discounting social outcomes. This,
of course, is the key idea behind extinction discounting, which we take up starting in
Sect. 5.
2.4 The strong argument
The first reason that KA gave for discounting, impatience, or time perspective was
what we will call the “strong argument”. This is to be distinguished from what Arrow
(1999b) explicitly describes as the “weak Koopmans argument”, which receives brief
attention in Sect. 2.6 below, as well as in Sect. 8.3.
9 Among numerous discussions of intergenerational equity, we mention here only Arrow et al. (1996). For
an extensive list of many other works, see our working paper Chichilnisky et al. (2018).
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To quote Arrow (1999b):10
Why then not embrace the idea of zero time perspective? Koopmans in several
classic papers (1960, 1964) gave a crushing answer; see also Brown and Lewis
(1981) for a more general treatment. The argument seems recondite. Koopmans
considers a world which lasts forever. Therefore choice (including ethically-
based choice) is based on a preference ordering over infinite-dimensional
consumption streams. He argues that if the ordering is continuous and also sen-
sitive (i.e., if one stream is never worse than another and is better at one or more
time points, then it must be strictly preferred), it must display impatience.
A simple restatement of his reasoning can bring out the essential point. I con-
fine myself to the intertemporally separable case. Imagine initially that output
consists of a constant stream of completely perishable goods. There can be no
investment by definition. Now imagine that an investment opportunity occurs,
available only to the first generation. For each unit sacrificed by them, a per-
petual stream of α per unit time is generated. If there were no time preference,
…we can say that given any investment, short of the entire income, a still greater
investment would be preferred.
Thus, Arrow concludes that without impatience the optimal saving rate could become
arbitrarily close to 100%. A similar conclusion emerges from the cake-eating example
described by Gale (1967, p. 4, Example 2).
Nevertheless, the following passage from Koopmans (1960, pp. 287–288) suggests
that he at least intended his results to be applied only in the rather different context of
consumer choice:
This study started out as an attempt to formulate postulates permitting a sharp
definition of impatience, the short term Irving Fisher has introduced for prefer-
ence for advanced timing of satisfaction. To avoid complications connected with
the advancing age and finite life span of the individual consumer, these postu-
lates were set up for a (continuous) utility function of a consumption program
extending over an infinite future period. The surprising result was that only a
slight strengthening of the continuity postulate …permits one to conclude from
the existence of a utility function satisfying the postulates, that impatience pre-
vails at least in certain areas of the program space.
Thus, it seems that Koopmans (and Diamond) started out by considering only con-
sumers who discount their own future selves, as discussed in Sect. 2.3.11 Nevertheless,
it was natural for Arrow to consider the obvious extension to social choice theory, with
an infinite series of successive generations. Indeed, this follows the tradition of the
10 The opening question in the quotation is a valuable addition in Arrow (1999b) to the corresponding
passage in Arrow (1999a). The second “classic paper” is presumably Koopmans et al. (1964).
11 Stern (2014b, p. 472; 2015, p. 169) also quotes a recent personal communication in which Peter Diamond,
a co-author of Koopmans et al. (1964), had argued to the effect that the results of this line of work, if they
would indeed preclude intergenerational equity, should not be applied to the issue of whether to discount
the welfare of future generations. Instead Diamond has argued in favour of the kind of “pragmatic” criteria
discussed in Sects. 6.7 and 6.8 of Chichilnisky et al. (2018).
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later works by Koopmans (1965, 1967), who even devotes part of these surveys to
the Ramsey case when the welfare of future generations remains undiscounted. Then
the same mathematical analysis which, under some conditions, shows that a consumer
cannot treat equally consumption in an infinite number of periods, also rules out inter-
generational equity, in the sense of treating all future generations equally.
2.5 Two kinds of domain restriction
Note that the strong argument says only that discounting is required if one tries to
construct a “sensitive” and continuous complete and transitive preference ordering
over an unrestricted domain of infinite consumption streams. When one considers a
suitably restricted domain of infinite intergenerational consumption streams, then as
KA was surely well aware, Ramsey (1928) had already shown that an optimal savings
plan could well exist without any discounting. More generally, following Gale (1967),
Mirrlees (1967) and others, there is a standard convergence condition for existence of
an optimal growth path satisfying the equation r = ρ + θg as a first-order condition
for the continuous time optimization problem. The convergence condition requires the
social rate of discount r to exceed the sum of the rate of growth of population and the
rate of technical progress. Indeed, if the elasticity θ is greater than 1, then the higher
is g (the growth rate, or rate of technical progress), the more likely it is that r become
large enough so that the relevant welfare integral converges. When it does converge,
one avoids the kind of oversaving problem that can arise in the cake-eating example
due to Gale (1967).12
The main result of our paper, however, considers a second kind of domain restriction.
Assuming a bounded utility function and an exogenous background extinction process,
we prove that a sensitive and continuous complete and transitive preference ordering
does exist on the restricted domain of personal consequence streams for which the
expected extinction discounted population is finite. Moreover, the ordering satisfies a
suitable version of intergerational equity.
2.6 The weak argument
Arrow (1999a) offered an additional reason for abandoning intergenerational equity:
I therefore conclude that the strong ethical requirement that all generations be
treated alike, itself reasonable, contradicts a very strong intuition that it is not
morally acceptable to demand excessively high savings rates of any one gener-
ation, or even of every generation.
A very similar argument is adduced in Arrow (1999b), where he adds:
Not merely is saving arbitrarily close to 100% unacceptable but very high sac-
rifices are also. I call this the weak Koopmans argument.
And in Arrow (2007, p. 4) he writes:
12 See Stern (2014b; 2015, p. 166) for some recent discussion.
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Tjalling Koopmans pointed out in effect that the savings rates implied by zero
time preference are very much higher than those we observe. (I am myself
convinced by this argument.)
This kind of argument, and its relation to intergenerational equity, were discussed
by Asheim et al. (2001) and then Asheim and Buchholz (2003). Their main result
demonstrates that, given any efficient and non-decreasing consumption allocation,
there exists a utility function for which that allocation is a unique maximum of the
undiscounted sum of utilities over all future generations. This relies, however, on
a key “technological” assumption that any efficient and non-decreasing consumption
allocation maximizes the finite present discounted value of consumption with discount
factors that decrease over time. This assumption seems to rule out the kind of climate
emergency that the world may be facing currently.
Later, the weak argument was discussed in Stern (2007, 2008, 2015)—see espe-
cially Stern (2008, p. 16), which cites Mirrlees and Stern (1972). In his comment on the
Stern Report, however, Arrow (2007, p. 4) himself suggests that, at least in the context
of mitigating climate change, the discounting issue may lack practical importance:
Many have complained about the Stern Review adopting a value of zero for ρ,
the social rate of time preference. However, I find that the case for intervention
to keep CO2 levels within bounds (say, aiming to stabilize them at about 550
ppm) is sufficiently strong as to be insensitive to the arguments about ρ.13
Thus, KA’s reasoning included the recognition that, even with substantial pure-time
discounting, unmanaged climate change has the potential to cause damage severe
enough to justify strong action.14
We would agree, while noting that Stern (2015) in particular discusses how many
current economic models fail to capture adequately the immense potential damage.
We also note the observation from Box 1 in Stern (2008, p. 20) that, for any choice
of discount rates, we can construct a stream of damages over time so that the present
discounted value of losses from climate change is infinite.
On the other hand we note that, in the years since Arrow wrote in (2007), there
has been extraordinary technical progress in developing renewable energy sources,
as well as low and even negative carbon technologies. This progress suggests that,
as discussed in Sect. 8.3, the “weak argument” in favour of discounting is steadily
becoming even weaker.
13 Since KA wrote this, the scientific evidence on the potential damage from unmanaged climate change
has grown ever more worrying. The IPCC (2018) report documents the significant risk of potentially very
large damages from allowing temperatures to rise by 2 ◦C instead of 1.5 ◦C. This supports the argument that
the Paris COP21 target agreed in December 2015 of holding temperature increases to “well below 2 ◦C”
should be tightened to 1.5 ◦C. Achieving this is likely to require net global CO2 emissions being reduced to
zero by 2050. In particular, KA’s suggestion that CO2 levels should be stabilized at about 550 ppm should
now be seen as far too high.
14 The later joint paper by Arrow et al. (2013) even advocates a declining discount factor, though this may
be easier to justify if it is applied to monetary measures of consumer benefit when these are increasing over
time.
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3 An impartial spectator’s fundamental utility
3.1 A universal domain of personal consequences
Our interest is in applying prescriptive social choice theory to the issue of determining
what discount rates one should apply to future generations’ welfare. For this application
we use an individualistic theory of social consequences that starts with a “universal”
personal consequence domain, which we take to be a non-empty set Y whose typical
member y has many attributes or dimensions.
We postulate that each personal consequence y ∈ Y is comprehensive. That is, it
must include everything that should be of concern to an idealized version of the “impar-
tial spectator” who plays such a key role in Adam Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments.
In particular, it must include the individual’s own preferences and beliefs, insofar as
they are deemed relevant. Consequences should also allow for variations in the date
and circumstances surrounding an individual’s birth, upbringing, and death, including
those aspects that also affect parents, partners and family members, especially “demo-
graphic consequences” of the kind considered in Hammond (1998). Also included
should be any adverse consequences of living in an unequal society, as well as any
favourable consequences that are often modelled as altruism. Other relevant dimen-
sions can deal with society’s respect for individual and group rights, as discussed in
Hammond (1995), as well as “deontological” or agent-relative consequences reflecting
how well individuals respect their social obligations.15
Of course, when considering intergenerational equity and discounting the future,
we also need to allow for intertemporal, even intergenerational consequences. These
imply that, in effect, one has overlapping generations. Thus, with one exception, we
assume that each consequence y ∈ Y has attributes which include personal copies of
any ethically relevant common or impersonal circumstances that are shared with other
persons.16
The one exception, which we use repeatedly from Sect. 5 on when discussing
extinction, is that we postulate one particular non-existence consequence y0 ∈ Y .
This is the unique personal consequence that comes about if and only if the person
concerned never exists. It corresponds to the consequence denoted by d in Bommier
and Zuber (2008). Note in particular that our framework allows for a variable number
of individuals, since those who are excluded and so whose personal consequences are
not deemed relevant can be modelled as experiencing the non-existence consequence
y0. This device will be especially useful in Sect. 7 when we discuss variable population
numbers.
15 This paragraph has been inspired in part by the issues that Patrick Suppes kindly raised when discussing
PH’s presentation of the paper that became Hammond (1988) to the May 1986 conference on “Distributive
Justice and Inequality” at the Wissenschaftskolleg zu Berlin. At the time, the most meaningful part of PH’s
inadequate response may have been the remark that philosophers like Pat excel at drawing attention to the
ethical relevance of consequences that belong to domains much richer than those usually considered by
economists. In some ways, our oral discussion foreshadowed the kind of procedure that, following Portmore
(2007, 2009), Brown (2011), and Mukerji (2016), philosophers now describe as “consequentialization”.
16 We note that our approach is very different from that of Feng and Ke (2018), whose individuals live for
only one period, but care about the future because of altruism.
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3.2 Fundamental cardinal utility
A standard economist’s view is that ethical theory should prescribe normatively
appropriate decisions for society. Following Hammond (1996, 1998) in particular,
we impose consequentialist rationality and continuity postulates implying that there
exists a unique cardinal equivalence class of von Neumann–Morgenstern utility func-
tions Y ∋ y → u(y) ∈ R with the property that the consequences of prescribed
behaviour in any finite decision tree should be a consequence lottery λ ∈ (Y ) that
maximizes lifetime expected utility
Eλu =
∑
y∈Y
λ(y) u(y) (1)
over the finite set of lifetime consequence lotteries that are feasible in the tree. Here
we are using the familiar definition that any two utility functions y → u(y) and
y → u˜(y) are cardinally equivalent just in case there exist an additive constant α ∈ R
and a positive multiplicative constant ρ ∈ R such that
u˜(y) = α + ρ u(y) for all y ∈ Y (2)
Any function Y ∋ y → u(y) in this cardinal equivalence class can be called
a fundamental utility function. This is because the preferences it represents are the
same for all individuals, both potential and actual, and so “fundamental” in the sense
considered by Tinbergen (1957) and Kolm (1972, 1994).
3.3 General discrete lotteries and bounded utility
Menger (1934) showed how to modify the well-known St. Petersburg paradox so that
it applies to any unbounded utility function. This result led Arrow (1951; 1965, pp.
28–44; 1971, ch. 2; 1972) to insist that utility should be bounded. Indeed, suppose
that expected utility is to be extended to a continuous function defined not only over
simple lotteries whose support is a finite set of possible outcomes, but also over
general discrete lotteries whose support is a countably infinite set of possible outcomes,
including extinction dates. Then analysis such as that in Hammond (1998, Sect 8),
which uses ideas from Blackwell and Girshick (1954), shows that any member of the
unique cardinal equivalence class of fundamental utility functions must be bounded.
Accordingly, from now on we make the following assumption:
Assumption 1 There exist both a common lower bound u and a common upper bound
u¯ > u such that, for all possible consequences y ∈ Y that any potential individual
may face, one has
u ≤ u(y) ≤ u¯ (3)
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3.4 A unique normalized fundamental utility function
The extensive literature on population ethics stemming from Sikora and Barry (1978)
and from Parfit (1984) commonly designates u(y0), the utility of non-existence, as the
neutral level of utility. Following Hammond (1988) and many other works, we invoke
what Blackorby et al. (1995, 2005) refer to as the “zero-critical level” principle, which
requires the normalization
u(y0) = 0 (4)
Obviously, this first normalization is especially convenient when, as in Sect. 7, we
need to consider a possibly infinite set of potential persons, of whom a variable finite
number come into existence.
This reduces the class of cardinally equivalent utility functions satisfying (4) to
those related by the restricted class of transformations that satisfy (2) for α = 0—i.e,
transformations of the form
u˜(y) = ρ u(y) for all y ∈ Y (5)
To single out a unique utility function from the equivalence class of fundamental
utility functions related by (5), we impose a second normalization. After ruling out
the trivial case when u(y) ≡ 0 throughout y, the particular normalization we adopt
is
supy∈Y |u(y)| = 1 (6)
4 Utilitarianism for an impartial benefactor
4.1 Social consequences as personal consequence profiles
Initially, we consider a fixed finite set I of individuals, of size n = #I . Later, starting
in Sect. 5, we will extend our analysis to potentially infinite populations. The latter
is of course the case that was of most concern to Arrow (1999a, b) when arguing that
future utilities should be discounted.
For now, however, given the fixed set of individuals I of size n, we take the social
consequence domain to be the Cartesian product Y I of n copies of the personal conse-
quence domain Y . So each social consequence y I ∈ Y I is a mapping I ∋ i → yi ∈ Y
that determines a personal consequence for each of the n individuals in I . Equivalently,
it is a list
y I = 〈yi 〉i∈I ∈ Y I (7)
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4.2 Biased and extended original positions
Vickrey (1945, 1960) and Harsanyi (1953, 1955, 1977, 1978, 1979) independently
formulated the idea that ethical social decisions would be those that were taken impar-
tially in a version of what Rawls (1971) later described as an “original position”,
behind a “veil of ignorance” where the decision-maker does not know which person
she or he will become eventually. In contrast to Rawls, what we will call the Vickrey–
Harsanyi original position requires the impartial benefactor to contemplate what to
choose if faced with an even chance lottery whose different outcomes are the personal
consequences of the various individuals in society—see also the discussion by Mongin
(2001) and others of Harsanyi’s “impartial observer”.
The theory presented here will also accommodate lotteries in the form of biased
original positions where, upon emerging from behind the probabilistic version of the
veil of ignorance, an arbitrary specified probability distribution μ ∈ (I ) determines
the probability μi of becoming each person i ∈ I . Indeed, we consider extended
original positions where these biased probabilities of becoming different people can
even be chosen.
4.3 Expected utility from a biased original position
Thus, we consider decision problems which reduce to choosing from consequences
that take the form of a lottery pair (λ, μ) ∈ (Y I )×(I ) over possible pairs (y I , i) ∈
Y I × I . So, for a suitable utility function Y I × I ∋ (y I , i) → u∗(y I , i) ∈ R, expected
utility is given by
∑
y I∈Y I
∑
i∈I
λ(y I ) μi u∗(y I , i) (8)
The purpose of an original position, however, is to reduce each consequence profile
y I ∈ Y I to a single consequence yi ∈ I where i ∈ I is chosen at random. This makes
it natural to specify, for each i ∈ I , that u∗(y I , i) can be reduced to u(yi ).
Consider now, for each joint distribution λ ∈ (Y I ) and each i ∈ I , the marginal
consequence lottery margi λ ∈ (Y ) over personal consequences which, for each
y ∈ Y , has probabilities given by
λi (y) := margi λ(y) := λ({y I ∈ Y I | yi = y}) (9)
Then define the compound lottery μ ◦ λ ∈ (Y × I ) so that, for every (y, i) in the
domain Y × I , one has
(μ ◦ λ)(y, i) := μi · margi λ(y) = μi · λi (y) (10)
Along with the assumption that u∗(y I , i) can be reduced to u(yi ), definitions (9) and
(10) evidently imply that the expected value (8) can be written as
Eμ◦λ[u(y)] = Eμ
[
Eλi [u(yi )]
]
=
∑
i∈I
μi
∑
yi∈Y
λi (yi ) u(yi ) (11)
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This is the expectation w.r.t. μ of different individuals’ expected utilities arising from
the relevant personal consequence lotteries λi .
4.4 An original position with suppes equity
No version of Adam Smith’s impartial spectator has the power to choose what individ-
ual it should represent upon emerging from behind the veil of ignorance. Thus, it must
treat the biased original position μ ∈ (I ) as fixed. Then it is reduced to choosing
λ ∈ (Y I ) in order to maximize the function (11) while treating μ ∈ (I ) as a fixed
vector of probabilistic weights. So the appropriate objective is the weighted utilitarian
Bergson social welfare function (or BSWF) defined by
(Y I ) ∋ λ → W (λ;μ) := Eμ◦λ[u(y)] =
∑
i∈I
μi
∑
yi∈Y
λi (yi ) u(yi ) (12)
We adapt definition 5 on p. 296 of Suppes (1966) to our context of a weighted
utilitarian Bergson social welfare function (12)—see also Sen (1970, Chapter 9*).
Specifically, we define a two-person decision situation as a pair of lotteries ν,
ρ ∈ (Y I ) for which there exist two individuals j, k ∈ I such that for all other
individuals i ∈ I \ { j, k}, the marginal distributions νi , ρi ∈ (Y ) satisfy νi = ρi . In
this case Eq. (12) implies that the welfare difference between ν and ρ is
W (ν;μ)− W (ρ;μ) = μ j
∑
y j∈Y
[ν j (y j )− ρ j (y j )] u(y j )
+μk
∑
yk∈Y
[νk(yk)− ρk(yk)] u(yk) (13)
Now, in this two-person situation, Suppes equity insists that interchanging the pairs of
marginal lotteries ν j , νk and ρ j , ρk of these two individuals should have no effect on
the social preference between ν andρ in(Y I ). In other words, we should consider the
two new lotteries ν˜, ρ˜ ∈ (Y I ) whose marginal distributions ν˜i , ρ˜i ∈ (Y ) satisfy
ν˜i = ντ j,k (i) and ρ˜i = ρτ j,k (i) for all i ∈ I , where I ∋ i → τ j,k(i) ∈ I is the
transposition mapping that interchanges individuals j and k while leaving all other
individuals unaffected. Then Suppes equity requires that
W (ν˜;μ)  W (ρ˜;μ) according as W (ν;μ)  W (ρ;μ) (14)
Evidently (13) is consistent with (14) for all pairs ν, ρ ∈ (Y I ) if and only ifμ j = μk .
Given that μ ∈ (I ) is a probability distribution and n = #I , evidently Suppes equity
holds for all pairs of individuals j, k ∈ I if and only if the weights satisfy μi = 1n for
all i ∈ I . So instead of the weighted sum (12), Suppes equity implies that we should
have an unweighted utilitarian BSWF of the form
(Y I ) ∋ λ → W (λ) :=
1
n
∑
i∈I
∑
yi∈Y
λi (yi ) u(yi ) (15)
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This, of course, is precisely the form that Vickrey (1945, 1960) and Harsanyi (1953,
1955, 1977, 1978, 1979) advocated, taking the view that ethical decisions are those
that would be made by an impartial benefactor who, by definition, acts as if facing
an original position in which there is an equal probability of becoming any of the n
individuals i ∈ I .
5 Extinction discounting of future generations
5.1 Generational structures
Inspired by Arrow (1999a, b, 2007) as well as Dasgupta and Heal (1979, ch. 9), our
concern is whether one should discount the utilities of individuals who belong to
future generations. To discuss this formally, we need an extended framework which
recognizes that different individuals can belong to different generations. So we label
each individual i ∈ I by a pair (ti , ki ) ∈ T × N. Here T denotes the set of possible
discrete times or dates, which is taken to be a copy of N, the countably infinite set of
natural numbers.
Corresponding to each time t ∈ T , generation t is defined as the enumerated finite
set G t of all individuals born at date t . This set can be identified with the Cartesian
product set {t} × Nnt of individuals whose first label is the date t , and whose second
label is a number that ranges over the set Nnt consisting of the first nt natural numbers.
Evidently, nt = #G t , and the set of all individuals who are ever born is the countably
infinite set
I = ∪t∈T ({t} × Nnt ) = ∪t∈T ({t} × G t ) ⊂ N × N (16)
The fact that I is infinite creates the obvious difficulty that there is no way for an
ethical benefactor to be impartial by acting as if there were an equal probability of
becoming each individual i ∈ I .
5.2 A hazard process of extinction and survival
Following Dasgupta and Heal (1979, ch. 9), our argument for extinction discount-
ing relies on treating extinction as a stochastic process. We do, however, focus on
unavoidable background extinction hazards, as opposed to new hazards that might
arise because of foolish policy. So, for each time t ∈ T , let E>t and E≤t respectively
denote the events that the background process does not result in extinction until after
time t , and the complementary event that extinction will occur at or before time t .
Let σt ∈ [0, 1] denote the survival probability of event E>t , and ηt := 1 − σt as the
probability of event E≤t .
The hazard rate associated with the extinction process determines the conditional
probability that extinction occurs at time t exactly given the event E>t−1 that it had
not already occurred by time t − 1. Thus, it is the function given by
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T ∋ t → ht :=
ηt − ηt−1
σt−1
=
σt−1 − σt
σt−1
= 1 −
σt
σt−1
∈ [0, 1] (17)
We assume that neither immediate extinction nor continued existence can ever be
predicted with probability 1, implying that 0 < ht < 1 for all t ∈ T . Evidently (17)
then implies that the functions t → σt and t → ηt are respectively strictly decreasing
and strictly increasing in t . We also assume that, in the limit as t →∞, the extinction
and survival probabilities satisfy
ηt → 1 and σt → 0 (18)
5.3 Extinction adjusted intergenerational equity
In Sect. 4.2 we represented an original position by a probability distributionμ ∈ (I ),
where I was finite. Now we consider the case introduced in Sect. 5.1 when I is
countably infinite. Instead of μ ∈ (I ), we require it to belong to ∗(I ), defined as
the set of discrete distributions over I . That is, the distribution μ takes the form of a
mapping I ∋ i → μi ∈ [0, 1] for which the countably infinite sum
∑
i∈I μi equals 1.
In this new setting, given any original position μ ∈ ∗(I ), any date t ∈ T , and
any individual i ∈ {t} × G t , define the extinction adjusted probability νi := μi/σt as
the conditional probability of selecting i given the event E>t . Previously, when I was
finite with n = #I , intergenerational equity required that μi = μ¯ = 1/n for all i ∈ I .
In this new setting when I is infinite but there is a background extinction process, we
say that the original positionμ ∈ ∗(I ) satisfies extinction adjusted intergenerational
equity just in case the extinction adjusted probabilities satisfy νi = ν¯ for all i ∈ I ,
implying that μi = ν¯ σt for all i ∈ {t} × G t . For these to be probabilities in ∗(I ),
evidently they must satisfy
1 =
∑
i∈I
μi =
∑
t∈T
∑
i∈{t}×Gt
ν¯ σt = ν¯
∑
t∈T
σt nt (19)
Given that, for each t ∈ T , the population of generation t is nt = #G t , let us now
define the extinction discounted total population as the infinite sum
n(GT ) :=
∑
t∈T
σt nt (20)
of non-negative terms, provided this sum converges to a finite number. But (20) con-
verges if and only if there exists ν¯ > 0 that solves Eq. (19). So the following result
follows immediately:
Proposition 1 There exists a unique original position μ ∈ ∗(I ) satisfying extinction
adjusted intergenerational equity if and only if the discounted expected total population
given by (20) is finite.
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5.4 Utilitarianismwith an infinite population
Consider any individual i who belongs to the generation G t that comes into existence
starting at the specific date t ∈ T . In this new setting with a background extinction
process, we reinterpret the marginal personal consequence lottery λi ∈ (Y ) that
faces any individual i ∈ I as the conditional lottery that i would experience given the
event E>t that extinction has not occurred by date t .
With this interpretation, the weighted utilitarian BSWF can be defined by (12) even
in our setting with an infinite set I provided that one has a well-defined infinite sum
∑
i∈I
μi
∑
yi∈Y
λi (yi ) u(yi ) =
∑
i∈I
μi Eλi u (21)
By definition, any original position μ ∈ ∗(I ) satisfies μi ≥ 0 for all I ∈ I and∑
i∈I μi = 1. This makes the following result entirely evident:
Proposition 2 Under the bounded utility assumption 1 in Sect. 3.3, the utilitarian sum
(21) converges absolutely for all original positions μ ∈ ∗(I ) and for all profiles
〈λi 〉i∈I of personal consequence lotteries λi ∈ (Y ).
5.5 Extinction discounted utilitarianism
Say that the objective (21) is extinction discounted utilitarian just in case the original
position μ ∈ ∗(I ) satisfies extinction adjusted intergenerational equity. Putting
Propositions 1 and 2 together leads to our main result:
Theorem 1 Given the fixed generation structure GT , under the normalization imposed
in Sect. 3.4, there is a uniquely specified extinction discounted utilitarian welfare
objective represented by the expected value of
Y I ∋ y I → W (y I ) =
1
n(GT )
∑
t∈T
σt
∑
i∈Gt
u(yi ) (22)
if and only if n(GT ) defined by (20) is finite.
6 Sustainable preferences
6.1 Sustainability
In Brundtland (1987), sustainable development was famously defined as:
…development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the
ability of future generations to meet their own needs.
Decades before, Hicks (1946, p. 174) had a similar idea when he defined an individual’s
“income” as
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…the maximum amount of money which the individual can spend this week,
and still expect to be able to spend the same amount in real terms in each ensuing
week.
In this spirit, and following Solow (1991, 2012), sustainability might be defined as
giving each generation access to an opportunity set that allows it to be no worse
off than it would have been with the opportunity set that was available to any of its
predecessors. This suggests trying to maximize the initial generation’s welfare level
subject to monotone sustainability—i.e., requiring successive generations’ welfare
levels to be non-decreasing over time.17
In 1993 KA invited GC to present work related to the concept of sustainable devel-
opment to a Stanford workshop on “The Reconsideration of Values”, in which PH
also participated. This led to the articles Chichilnisky (1996, 1997, 2009) which went
beyond the extensively discussed criterion of “sustainable development” and pioneered
the new concept of “sustainable preferences” or “sustainable welfare criterion”.
In the framework of generation structures set out in Sect. 5.1, it is natural to consider
sustainable preferences over lotteries with infinite-dimensional personal consequence
profiles y I ∈ Y I as outcomes. Moreover, the relevant welfare criterion should be the
expected value of some uniformly bounded von Neumann–Morgenstern social utility
function
Y I ⊇ D ∋ y I → V (y I ) ∈ R (23)
defined on a possibly restricted domain D of personal consequence streams y I that
belong to the countably infinite Cartesian product set Y I . Moreover, the function
y I → V (y I ) should satisfy the Pareto criterion.
6.2 Dictatorship of the present or the future
Following Chichilnisky (1996, pp. 240–241), a “dictatorship of the present” is a wel-
fare criterion which, after some generation that depends on the choices at hand, is
insensitive to the welfare of all succeeding generations. In other words, a dictatorship
of the present occurs if a strict preference for one personal consequence stream y I
over an alternative stream y˜ I can never be overturned by any changes in these two
streams that affect only sufficiently distant generations.
By contrast, a “dictatorship of the future” is insensitive to the welfare of the present,
disregarding the welfare of all generations that precede some generation. In other
words, a dictatorship of the future occurs if a strict preference for one personal conse-
quence stream y I over an alternative stream y˜ I can never be overturned by any changes
in these two streams that affect only generations sufficiently close to the present.
Using alternative terminology suggested by Heal (1998, p. 69), a criterion dis-
playing dictatorship of the present is insensitive to the long-run future; whereas one
displaying dictatorship of the future is insensitive to the present. Sustainability allows
17 For a fuller discussion of sustainability in this sense, see inter alia Hammond (1993) as well as Pezzey
(1997, p. 451) and Asheim (2007). See also Llavador et al. (2015).
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neither form of temporal dictatorship. Somewhat surprisingly, it is relatively easy to
find welfare criteria that are sustainable in this sense.
6.3 Formal definitions
The following formal definitions adapt those of Chichilnisky (1996) to the current
setting where: (i) there is a fixed generational structure GT , as defined in Sect. 5.1;
(ii) the social objective is the expected value of a von Neumann–Morgenstern social
utility function as in (23).
Definition 1 Given a generational structure GT , a welfare criterion V : D → R on
the domain D ⊆ Y I is a dictatorship of the present if for all pairs y I , y˜ I ∈ D with
V (y I ) > V (y˜ I ), there exists a date s = s(y I , y˜ I ) ∈ T such that if any pair z I , z˜ I ∈ Y I
satisfies
i ∈ ∪st=1G t ⇒ zi = yi and z˜i = y˜i (24)
then z I , z˜ I ∈ D and V (z I ) > V (z˜ I ).
Definition 2 Given a generational structure GT , a welfare criterion V : D → R on
the domain D ⊆ Y I is a dictatorship of the future if for all pairs y I , y˜ I ∈ D with
V (y I ) > V (y˜ I ), there exists a date s = s(y I , y˜ I ) ∈ N such that if the pair z I , z˜ I ∈ Y I
satisfies
i ∈ ∪∞t=s G t ⇒ zi = yi and z˜i = y˜i (25)
then z I , z˜ I ∈ D and V (z I ) > V (z˜ I ).
Note that the only difference between these two definitions concerns the conditions
(24) and (25). These determine whether the strict preference between two personal
consequence streams remains unchanged after alterations in the consequence streams
only for all generations that originate: either (i), in the case of Definition 1, after date s,
so sufficiently far into the future; or (ii), in the case of Definition 2, before date s, so
sufficiently close to the present;
The last definition of this Section also adapts that of Chichilnisky (1996) to the
current setting where, with fixed generation structure GT , the social objective is the
expected value of a von Neumann–Morgenstern social welfare function defined on a
restricted domain D ⊂ Y I .
Definition 3 Given a restricted domain D ⊂ Y I of admissible personal consequence
streams, a sustainable von Neumann–Morgenstern social utility function is a mapping
D ∋ y I → V (y I ) ∈ R which satisfies the Pareto criterion, and is neither a dictatorship
of the present, nor a dictatorship of the future.
6.4 Example of sustainable preferences
The following example offers a two-dimensional parametric class of sustainable pref-
erences.
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Example 1 Given the fixed generation structure GT , consider any fixed stream of
discount factors βT ∈ RT++ for which total discounted population
∑
t∈T βt #G t is
finite. Suppose the boundedness assumption 1 of Sect. 3.3 is satisfied. Then, for any
pair of parameters α ∈ [0, 1] andω ∈ (0, 1), consider the von Neumann–Morgenstern
welfare function
Y I ∋ y I → (y I ;βT , α, ω) := (1 − ω)
∑
t∈T
βt
∑
i∈Gt (y I )
u(yi )
+ω
[
α lim inf
i→∞
u(yi )+ (1 − α) lim sup
i→∞
u(yi )
]
(26)
This puts positive weight 1−ω on the first term, which is a dictatorship of the present,
and positive weight ω on the second term, which is a dictatorship of the future. The
strict convex combination of these two defines sustainable preferences.
For a possible interpretation of (26), suppose we relax condition (18) so that, for
some ω ∈ (0, 1), it becomes ηt → 1 − ω and σt → ω. Suppose too that for each
t ∈ T we interpret βt as the conditional probability of generation G t coming into
existence given that extinction does occur at some finite time. Then (26) becomes
expected utility when:
1. with probability 1 − ω, extinction does occur in finite time, with survival proba-
bilities specified by βt ;
2. with probability ω, extinction never occurs, and the utility of the resulting infinite
consequence stream is given by the second term of (26).
Note too that the second term of (26) is an asymptotic form of the “Hurwicz
criterion” for decisions under uncertainty that was discussed, inter alia, in Arrow and
Hurwicz (1972). Here the parameter α can be regarded as a “coefficient of pessimism”.
6.5 Other sustainable preferences
Going beyond the class of preferences set out in Example 1, Chichilnisky (1996) char-
acterizes sustainable preferences for the important special case when the preference
ordering over sure consequence streams is represented by a utilitarian social welfare
function defined on the Banach space ℓ∞ of all bounded utility streams in R∞ that
is not only strictly increasing and continuous, but is also linear. For this important
special case, Theorem 2 of Chichilnisky (1996) offers a complete characterization of
all sustainable welfare criteria using finitely additive measures that represent linear
functionals in the dual of ℓ∞. See Chichilnisky (1996, 1997, 2009), Heal (1998), and
Lauwers (2017) for further discussion.
Among other work that discusses sustainable preferences, especially in the context
of renewable and exhaustible resources, we mention Figuières and Tidball (2012).
This builds on work by Chichilnisky et al. (1995) that considers “the green golden
rule”.
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7 Endogenous population
7.1 A domain with endogenous generation structures
The framework of our earlier working paper Chichilnisky et al. (2018) allowed the
generation structure GT to be chosen. In this extended framework, since the set of
individuals I is variable, the concept of an original position μ ∈ ∗(I ) needs to be
changed.
First, we replace the fixed generation structure GT = 〈G t 〉t∈T of Sect. 5.1, with
G t = Nnt for each t ∈ T and I = ∪t∈T ({t} × G t ), by:
1. an extended generation structure MT = 〈Mt 〉t∈T of finite maximal population sets
for each generation, with Mt = Nmt for each t ∈ T ;
2. an overall maximal set M := ∪t∈T ({t} × Mt ).
Given the structure MT , we limit attention to a restricted domain D(MT ) of sequences
(GT , y I ) that satisfy:
1. G t ⊆ Mt for all t ∈ T ;
2. yi ∈ Y \ {y0} for all i ∈ I = ∪t∈T G t .
Thus, the personal consequence of each i ∈ G t excludes non-existence.
7.2 An extended original position
We can now extend this domain D(MT ) to a new domain Dˆ(MT ) that includes any
personal consequence profile yM ∈ Y M for the fixed maximal set of potential persons.
To do this, simply recognize that all individuals i ∈ ∪t∈T (Mt \ G t ) do not exist by
defining
yi = y0 for all i ∈ ∪t∈T (Mt \ G t ) (27)
This brings us back to our previous framework with the fixed generation structure MT
replacing GT .
If an original position ν ∈ ∗(M) exists that satisfies the appropriate intergenera-
tional equity condition given extinction, there must exist a constant κ > 0 such that
νi = κ σt for all t ∈ T and i ∈ Mt . As in the derivation of (19) in Sect. 5.3, a neces-
sary and sufficient condition for such an original position to exist is that the extinction
discounted sum of the maximum population number in each generation given by
m(MT ) :=
∑
t∈T
σt #Mt =
∑
t∈T
σt mt (28)
is finite. When it is finite, the obvious counterpart of (22) is the NM welfare function
Y M ∋ yM → W M (MT , yM ) :=
1
m(MT )
∑
t∈T
σt
∑
i∈Mt
u(yi ) (29)
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Because (27) implies that u(yi ) = 0 for all i ∈ ∪t∈T [{t}×(Mt \G t )], then provided
that m(MT ) defined by (28) is finite, the extinction discounted welfare sum (29) can
obviously be reduced to
W (GT , y I ) :=
1
m(MT )
∑
t∈T
σt
∑
i∈Gt
u(yi ) (30)
That is, we exclude the zero utilities of all the individuals whose existence is precluded
by (27). The result is a welfare function defined on the restricted domain D(MT ) of
pairs (GT , y I ) satisfying restrictions 1 and 2 above.
7.3 Total expected utility
The only role that the extended generation structure MT and, when it is well-defined,
the associated constant m(MT ) play in (30) is in allowing W (GT , y I ) to be inter-
preted as expected welfare for an impartial benefactor facing an original position with
extinction discounted intergenerational equity. This interpretation relies only on the
maximal generational structure MT and implied extinction discounted total popula-
tion m(MT ) being large enough to include all relevant generational structures GT that
could result from policy choices. This allows us to treat MT and m(MT ) as exogenous
provided we restrict attention to the domain Dˆ(MT )—or equivalently, after removing
non-existent individuals, to the domain D(MT ).
Once we do treat MT and m(MT ) as exogenous, and so fixed constants, maximizing
the expectation of (30) is obviously equivalent to maximizing extinction discounting
total utility, defined by
W total(GT , y I ) :=
∑
t∈T
σt
∑
i∈Gt
u(yi ) (31)
This definition makes the extended generation structure MT and, when it is well-
defined, the associated constant m(MT ) entirely irrelevant, except insofar as one
is able to construct them throughout the domain of the function D ∋ (GT , y I )
→ W total(GT , y I ).
7.4 The domain for total expected utility
We now construct the domain D over which, for some large enough set of potential
individuals, the total utilitarian objective (31) can be interpreted as rescaled expected
utility of an impartial benefactor in a suitable original position with intergenerational
equity and extinction discounting. To do so, first define for each non-negative real
r ∈ R+:
1. the set
Gr := {GT |
∑
t∈T
σt #G t ≤ r}
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of generation structures for which the extinction discounted total population does
not exceed r ;
2. the associated domain
Dr := {(GT , y I ) ∈ Gr × y I | ∀i ∈ ∪t∈T G t : yi = y0}
Then the domain D we are seeking is evidently the infinite union D := ∪r∈R+Dr .
This, of course, is the domain of associated pairs (GT , y I ) over which the extinction
discounted total population
∑
t∈T σt #G t is not only finite, but uniformly bounded.
Indeed, because W total(GT , y I ) is uniformly bounded over this domain D, its
expected value represents the appropriate preference ordering over the space ∗(D)
of discrete lotteries over this domain.
Let G denote the domain of all generation structures GT for which
∑
t∈T σt #G t
is finite. We remark that then (31) remains valid as a definition of a BSWF even over
the extended domain
Dˆ := (GT , y I ) ∈ G × y I | ∀i ∈ ∪t∈T G t : yi = y0}
Thus, the extinction discounted total population
∑
t∈T σt #G t need not be uniformly
bounded if one does not require there to be one extinction discounted original position
that works throughout the domain Dˆ of pairs (GT , y I ).
8 Concluding discussion
8.1 Revisiting intergenerational equity
In Sects. 3 and 4 we reviewed the ethical arguments we favour for choosing poli-
cies whose consequences maximize the expected utility of an impartial benefactor.
In particular, this benefactor should act as if placed in a Vickrey–Harsanyi original
position with an equal probability of becoming any individual, as the Suppes equity
criterion requires. When confronted, however, with long-term consequences such as
those connected to climate change, then as argued in Hammond (1973), since any
finite horizon will eventually be reached, consistent planning requires us to allow an
indefinite future. With a potential infinite set of individuals as well as infinite time, we
are confronted with what Arrow (1999a, b) called the “strong argument” for discount-
ing the welfare of future generations. This is that, given other standard assumptions,
avoiding discounting would produce some form of logical contradiction.
To circumvent this argument, we first dispose of a third source of possible diver-
gence in expected utility sums—unbounded utility. Specifically, we follow Arrow
(1951, 1965, 1971, 1972) himself and assume that the common fundamental util-
ity function of each potential individual is bounded both above and below. Then we
circumvent the problem of infinitely many time periods by first recognizing an exoge-
nous background extinction process ensuring that with probability 1 all life will cease
in finite time. Then we modify intergenerational equity by considering an extinction
adjusted original position in which individuals in different generations get chosen
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with equal conditional probabilities given that their generation survives the extinction
process. We show that this adjusted original position exists if and only if, given the
fixed background extinction process, the expected discounted population is uniformly
bounded by some finite number. When this condition is satisfied, the assumption of
bounded utility ensures that the impartial benefactor’s expected utility sum converges
absolutely.
Our great friend KA had espoused both strong and weak arguments in favour of
discounting the welfare of future generations not only in writings such as Arrow
(1999a, b, 2007), but also in later oral discussions with PH and others. Yet his willing-
ness to engage in these discussions suggests that, in the end, he may have been starting
to experience some doubt about whether these two arguments, which he attributed to
Koopmans, really had settled the discounting issue. Perhaps he was moving rapidly
toward our own current view that the purely technical difficulties captured by the
strong argument should not be allowed to overwhelm pragmatic ethical arguments
which recognize the existence of a background extinction process, and allow extinc-
tion discounting.
8.2 Beyondwelfarism
As in most of public economics, including work by KA himself, the approach set
out in this paper is utilitarian. It is a fortiori welfarist as well as consequentialist,
though with an all-encompassing domain of personal consequences, as explained in
Sect. 3.1. Nevertheless, it is just one way of looking at the ethics of public and private
decision-making. Indeed, several other approaches have commanded the attention of
philosophers when they undertake ethical arguments. Among these others are: (i)
contractarianism; (ii) Kantian ethics; (iii) Aristotelian ethics; (iv) arguments based
on rights or liberty. This is not the place for a detailed discussion, some elements of
which are provided in Stern (2014a; 2015, Chapter 6), along with references to further
discussion of these different ethical perspectives.
Here we simply note that these four perspectives that go beyond welfarism would
all seem to exclude discounting the welfare of individuals who belong to future
generations. It follows that all urge strong action on climate change. Specifically, a
contractarian would likely regard a reasonable or acceptable social contract as exclud-
ing decisions such as those resulting from an unacceptable dictatorship of the present
which rides roughshod over future lives by refusing to manage climate change. A Kan-
tian categorical imperative is to behave as you would have others behave; that would
likely involve respecting others’ livelihoods, even if they live decades later. Similarly,
an Aristotelian notion of virtue would likely prohibit seriously damaging others’ lives
in pursuit of narrow self-interest. Finally, any approach based on rights would surely
include respecting the rights of future generations.
We conclude that ethical arguments against discrimination by date of birth also
apply in ethical frameworks that transcend utilitarian consequentialism. “Pure-time
discounting” is not merely a narrow technical concern for nerdy economists. Avoiding
this kind of discrimination is fundamental to most ethical doctrines.
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8.3 The“weak argument”: a more optimistic scenario?
Much remains to be done in reforming the world’s economic system in order to avoid
the serious risk of catastrophic climate change due to excessive greenhouse gas emis-
sions. Other serious risks include excessive acidification by dissolved CO2, not only
of oceans, but also of reserves of fresh water. Another important concern is the loss
of biodiversity.
Nevertheless, there are two reasons why the sacrifices required of either the current
or future generations may turn out ultimately to be considerably less than had been
feared back in the late 1990s. This was the period when negotiations were conducted
which led to the Kyoto Protocol being approved by 160 nations in 1997, and becoming
part of international law in 2005 after enough nations had ratified it.18
First, as is becoming widely recognized, the last ten or fifteen years have seen quite
extraordinary technical progress, especially in using wind and solar power instead of
steam to generate electricity. Along with technologies such as those that allow vehicles
to use electric power to varying degrees, this is part of a general process whereby clean
or zero-carbon technologies have become cheaper than high-carbon technologies in
many sectors and geographical areas. In large measure this transformation has come
about as a result of combining changes in social priorities with a process that KA
did so much to illuminate in Arrow (1962)—namely the dynamics of learning by
doing. Indeed, we may have within reach a new model of sustainable growth which
is much more attractive and more inclusive than those experienced hitherto. It could
include, for example, cities where the inhabitants and commuting workers can move
and breathe, There can also be far higher resource productivity, as well as ecosystems
which are robust and fruitful. Achieving such goals will require radical change that
relies on major innovation and large investments. Those investments, however, would
likely yield very high social returns.
Second, it may be appropriate to draw attention to the much less well known yet
highly promising technologies for CO2 removal by direct air capture that one of us
(GC) has been helping to pioneer.19 Moreover, there is some prospect in the next
few years of complementary technical changes enhancing the use of CO2 as a valu-
able industrial input. Indeed, a carbon X-prize was recently announced, intended to
“challenge the world to reimagine what we can do with CO2 emissions by incentiviz-
ing and accelerating the development of technologies that convert CO2 into valuable
products.”20
Until relatively recently, it had seemed that the world would find it difficult to reduce
the atmospheric concentration of greenhouse gases to safer levels without significant
sacrifices of economic progress. The prospect of such sacrifices had become of great
concern to KA who, during the last two decades of his life, addressed this kind of
issue in several co-authored publications such as Arrow et al. (2003, 2004, 2012,
2013, 2014). Yet thanks in large part to recent technological developments, the world,
18 Chichilnisky and Sheeran (2009) offer one account of these negotiations, particularly the final stages
that took place in Kyoto.
19 GC is the co-inventor and co-patentee of Carbon Negative Technology™, as described by Eisenberger
et al. (2009), Chichilnisky (2011), Chichilnisky and Eisenberger (2011), as well as Choi et al. (2011).
20 See http://www.carbon.xprize.org.
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including we think KA himself during his last years, has been thinking more and more
about policies that can manage change rather than discussing what “sacrifices” might
be worthwhile. Indeed, there is the real prospect that directly capturing CO2 from the
air could soon replace existing sources of this widely used industrial gas and earn
sufficient profit to make the sacrifice disappear entirely. In any case, this emphasis on
how to manage change becomes even more urgent once we begin to consider other
issues, such as those concerning human health and the robustness of ecosystems; here
too KA has had so much to say. His legacy is truly extraordinary.
Acknowledgements This is a major revision and abridged version of our working paper Chichilnisky et al.
(2018), which offers much more detailed discussion of some points, especially regarding the history behind
some of the main ideas used here.
Our most important debt is to Kenneth Arrow, not only for his inspiration and continual enthusiastic support
of our research work, but also for the privilege of frequent academically productive and challenging meetings
with GC and PH in particular, which extended until the last months of his long life. Furthermore, the idea for
this paper emerged from discussions with KA where PH had even proposed the possibility of a joint paper
on the discounting issue, intended as a tribute to our mutual friend Patrick Suppes, formerly an advisory
editor of this journal.
We also thank editor Marc Fleurbaey, as well as Tim Besley, Luis Corchón, Peter Diamond, Juan Dolado,
Humberto Llavador, James Mirrlees, Eytan Sheshinski, and especially two anonymous referees for their
very helpful comments.
We also note that, while the three authors might weight different arguments differently, all fully agree on
the main implications of our results.
Finally GC and NS wish to credit PH with doing more than his fair share of the work; PH responds that
therefore he is doubtless responsible for a disproportionate share of any errors.
OpenAccess This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License, which
permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give
appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence,
and indicate if changes were made. The images or other third party material in this article are included
in the article’s Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If
material is not included in the article’s Creative Commons licence and your intended use is not permitted
by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the
copyright holder. To view a copy of this licence, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/.
References
Arrow KJ (1951) Alternative approaches to the theory of choice in risk-taking situations. Econometrica
19(4):404–437
Arrow KJ (1962) The economic implications of learning by doing. Rev Econ Stud 29(3):155–173
Arrow KJ (1963) Social choice and individual values, 2nd edn. Yale University Press, New Haven
Arrow KJ (1965) Aspects of the theory of risk-bearing. North- Holland, Amsterdam
Arrow KJ (1971) Essays in the theory of risk-bearing. Markham; North-Holland, Chicago; Amsterdam
Arrow KJ (1972) Exposition of the theory of choice under uncertainty. In: McGuire CB, Radner R (eds)
Decision and organization. North-Holland, Amsterdam, pp 19–55 ch. 2
Arrow KJ (1977) Extended sympathy and the possibility of social choice. Am Econ Rev Pap Proc 67(1):219–
225
Arrow KJ (1999a) Inter-generational equity and the rate of discount in long-term social investment. In:
Sertel MR (ed) Contemporary economic issues. International Economic Association Series, Palgrave
Macmillan, London, pp 89–102
Arrow KJ (1999b) Discounting, morality, and gaming. In: Portney PR, Weyant JP (eds) Discounting and
intergenerational effects. Resources for the Future Press, Washington DC, pp 13–21
123
Intergenerational equity with extinction discounting
Arrow KJ (2007) Global climate change: a challenge to policy. The economists’ voice. Published Online:
2007-06-30 https://doi.org/10.2202/1553-3832.1270
Arrow KJ, Cline WR, Mäler K-G, Munasinghe M, Stiglitz JE (1996) Intertemporal equity, discounting, and
economic efficiency. In: Bruce JP, Lee H, Haites EF (eds) Climate change 1995: economic and social
dimensions of climate change, contribution of Working Group III to the second assessment report of
the intergovernmental panel on climate change. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 1–32
Arrow KJ, Cropper ML, Gollier C, Groom B, Heal GM, Newell RG, Nordhaus WD, Pindyck RS, Pizer
WA, Portney PR, Sterner T, Tol RSJ, Weitzman ML (2013) Determining benefits and costs for future
generations. Science 341:349–350
Arrow KJ, Cropper ML, Gollier C, Groom B, Heal GM, Newell RG, Nordhaus WD, Pindyck RS, Pizer WA,
Portney PR, Sterner T, Tol RSJ, Weitzman ML (2014) Should governments use a declining discount
rate in Project analysis? Rev Environ Econ Policy 8(2):145–163
Arrow KJ, Dasgupta P, Goulder L, Daily G, Ehrlich P, Heal G, Levin S, Mäler K-G, Schneider S, Starrett
D, Walker B (2004) Are we consuming too much? J Econ Perspect 18(3):147–172
Arrow KJ, Dasgupta P, Goulder LH, Mumford KJ, Oleson K (2012) Sustainability and the measurement of
wealth. Environ Dev Econ 17(3):317–353
Arrow KJ, Dasgupta P, Mäler K-G (2003) The genuine savings criterion and the value of population. Econ
Theor 21(2):217–225
Arrow KJ, Debreu G (1954) Existence of an equilibrium for a competitive economy. Econometrica
22(3):265–290
Arrow KJ, Hurwicz L (1972) An optimality criterion for decision-making under ignorance. In: Carter DF,
Ford F (eds) Uncertainty and expectations in economics. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Arrow KJ, Kurz M (1970) Public investment, the rate of return and optimal fiscal policy. Johns Hopkins
University Press, Baltimore
Arrow KJ, Lind RC (1970) Uncertainty and the evaluation of public investment decisions. Am Econ Rev
60(3):364–378
Asheim GB (2007) “Economic analysis of sustainability” Chapter 1 of justifying, characterizing and indi-
cating sustainability. Springer, Dordrecht
Asheim GB, Buchholz W (2003) The malleability of undiscounted utilitarianism as a criterion of intergen-
erational justice. Economica 70:405–422
Asheim GB, Buchholz W, Tungodden B (2001) Justifying sustainability. J Environ Econ Manag 41:252–268
Blackorby C, Bossert W, Donaldson DJ (1995) Intertemporal population ethics: critical-level utilitarian
principles. Econometrica 63(6):1303–1320
Blackorby C, Bossert W, Donaldson DJ (2005) Population issues in social choice theory, welfare economics,
and ethics. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Blackorby C, Bossert W, Donaldson D, Fleurbaey M (1998) Critical levels and the (Reverse) repugnant
conclusion. J Econ (Zeitschrift für Nationalökonomie) 67(1):1–15
Blackwell D, Girshick MA (1954) Theory of games and statistical decisions. Wiley, Hoboken
Bommier A, Zuber S (2008) Can preferences for catastrophe avoidance reconcile social discounting with
intergenerational equity? Soc Choice Welf 31:415–434
Broome J (1993) A cause of preference is not an object of preference. Soc Choice Welf 10(1):57–68
Brown C (2011) Consequentialize this. Ethics 121(4):749–771
Brown DJ, Lewis LM (1981) Myopic economic agents. Econometrica 49(2):359–368
Brundtland GH (1987) Report of the World Commission on environment and development: our common
future. Oxford University Press, for the United Nations, Oxford
Chichilnisky G (1996) An axiomatic approach to sustainable development. Soc Choice Welf 13(2):231–257
Chichilnisky G (1997) What is sustainable development? Land Econ 73(4):467–491
Chichilnisky G (2009) Avoiding extinction: equal treatment of the present and the future. Econ Open-Access
Open-Assess E-J 3(2009–32):1–25. https://doi.org/10.5018/economics-ejournal.ja.2009-32
Chichilnisky G (2011) Green capitalism: negative carbon and the green power fund. Int J Green Econ
Indersci Enterp Ltd 5(4):321–333
Chichilnisky G, Eisenberger P (2011) Carbon negative power plants. CryoGas International, May, p. 36
Chichilnisky G, Hammond P, Stern NH (2018) Should We Discount the Welfare of Future Generations?
Ramsey and Suppes versus Koopmans and Arrow. Working paper, http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/107726
Chichilnisky G, Heal G, Beltratti A (1995) The green golden rule. Econ Lett 49(2):175–179
Chichilnisky G, Sheeran KA (2009) Saving Kyoto: an insider’s guide to what it is, how it works and what
it means for the future. New Holland Publishers Ltd, Cape Town
123
G. Chichilnisky
Choi S, Drese JH, Eisenberger PM, Jones CW (2011) Application of amine-tethered solid sorbents for direct
CO2 capture from the ambient air. Environ Sci Technol 45(6):2420–7
Dasgupta PS, Heal GM (1979) Economic theory and exhaustible resources. Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge
Diamond PA (1965) The evaluation of infinite utility streams. Econometrica 33:170–177
Eisenberger PM, Cohen RW, Chichilnisky G et al (2009) Global warming and carbon-negative technology:
prospects for a lower-cost route to a lower-risk atmosphere. Energy Environ 20:973–984
Feng T, Ke S (2018) Social discounting and intergenerational Pareto. Econometrica 86(5):1537–1567
Figuières C, Tidball M (2012) Sustainable exploitation of a natural resource: a satisfying use of
Chichilnisky’s criterion. Econ Theor 49(2):243–265
Gale D (1967) On optimal development in a multi-sector economy. Rev Econ Stud 34(1):1–18
Hammond PJ (1973) Consistent Planning and Intertemporal Welfare Economics. Ph.D. dissertation, Uni-
versity of Cambridge
Hammond PJ (1975) A note on extreme inequality aversion. J Econ Theory 11:465–467
Hammond PJ (1976) Equity, Arrow’s conditions, and Rawls’ difference principle. Econometrica 44(4):793–
804
Hammond PJ (1979) Equity in two-person situations: some consequences. Econometrica 47(5):1127–1135
Hammond PJ (1988) Consequentialist demographic norms and parenting rights. Soc Choice Welf 5:127–145
Hammond PJ (1992) On the impossibility of perfect capital markets. In: Dasgupta P, Gale D, Hart O, Maskin
E (eds) Economic analysis of markets and games: essays in Honor of Frank Hahn. Press, Cambridge,
M.I.T, pp 527–560
Hammond PJ (1993) Is there anything new in the concept of sustainable development? In: Campiglio L,
Pineschi L, Siniscalco D, Treves T (eds) The environment after Rio: international law and economics.
Graham & Trotman, 1994, London, pp 185–194 ch. 13
Hammond PJ (1995) Social choice of individual and group rights. In: Barnett WA, Moulin H, Salles M,
Schofield N (eds) Social choice, welfare, and ethics. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp
55–77
Hammond PJ (1996) Consequentialism, structural rationality and game theory. In: Arrow KJ, Colombatto
E, Perlman M, Schmidt C (eds) The rational foundations of economic behaviour (IEA Conference
volume No. 114). Macmillan, London, pp 25–42 ch. 2
Hammond PJ (1998) Objective expected utility: a consequentialist perspective. In: Barberà S, Hammond PJ,
Seidl C (eds) Handbook of utility theory, Vol. 1: principles. Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht,
pp 145–211 ch. 5
Harrod RF (1948) Towards a dynamic economics. Macmillan, London
Harsanyi JC (1953) Cardinal utility in welfare economics and in the theory of risk-taking. J Polit Econ
61:434–435
Harsanyi JC (1955) Cardinal welfare, individualistic ethics, and interpersonal comparisons of utility. J Polit
Econ 63(4):309–321
Harsanyi JC (1975) Can the maximin principle serve as a basis for morality? a critique of John Rawls’s
theory. Am Polit Sci Rev 69:594–606
Harsanyi JC (1977) Morality and the theory of rational behavior. Soc Res 44:623–656
Harsanyi JC (1978) Bayesian decision theory and utilitarian ethics. Am Econ Rev (Papers and Proceedings)
68:223–228
Harsanyi JC (1979) Bayesian decision theory, rule utilitarianism, and Arrow’s impossibility theorem. Theor
Decis 11:289–317
Heal GM (1998) Valuing the future: economic theory and sustainability. Columbia University Press, New
York
Hicks JR (1946) Value and capital: an inquiry into some fundamental principles of economic theory.
Clarendon Press, Oxford
IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change) (2018) Global Warming of 1.5◦C: An IPCC special
report, www.ipcc.ch/sr15
Kolm S-C (1972, 1998) Justice et équité (Paris: CNRS); translated as Justice and Equity. MIT Press,
Cambridge
Kolm S-C (1994) The meaning of ‘fundamental preferences’. Soc Choice Welf 11(3):193–198
Koopmans TC (1960) Stationary ordinal utility and impatience. Econometrica 28(2):287–309
Koopmans TC (1965) On the concept of optimal economic growth. Acad Sci Scr Varia 28(1):225–287
reprinted as Cowles Foundation Paper 238
123
Intergenerational equity with extinction discounting
Koopmans TC (1967) Objectives, constraints, and outcomes in optimal growth models. Econometrica
35(1):1–15
Koopmans TC, Diamond PA, Williamson RE (1964) Stationary utility and time perspective. Econometrica
32(1–2):82–100
Lauwers L (2017) The axiomatic approach to the ranking of infinite utility streams. In: Chichilnisky G, Rezai
A (eds) The economics of the global environment: catastrophic risks in theory and policy. Springer
International, New York, pp 231–255
Llavador H, Roemer JE, Silvestre J (2015) Sustainability for a warming planet. Harvard University Press,
Cambridge
Menger K (1934) Das Unsicherheitsmoment in der Wertlehre, Betrachtungen im Anschluss an das soge-
nannte Petersburger Spiel. Zeitschrift für Nationalökonomie 5: 459–485; translated under the title The
Role of Uncertainty in Economics. In: Shubik M (ed.) (1967) Essays in Mathematical Economics in
Honor of Oskar Morgenstern. Princeton University Press, Princeton, ch. 16, pp 211–231
Mirrlees JA (1963) Optimum Accumulation Under Uncertainty. Ph.D. dissertation, University of Cambridge
Mirrlees JA (1967) Optimum growth when technology is changing. Rev Econ Stud 34(1):95–124
Mirrlees JA, Stern NH (1972) Fairly good plans. J Econ Theory 4(2):268–288
Mongin P (2001) The impartial observer theorem of social ethics. Econ Philos 17:147–179
Mukerji N (2016) The case against consequentialism reconsidered. Springer, New York
Ord T (2020) The precipice: existential risk and the future of humanity. Bloomsbury Press, London
Parfit D (1984) Reasons and persons. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Pezzey J (1997) Sustainability constraints versus ‘optimality’ versus intertemporal concern, and axioms
versus data. Land Econ 73:448–466
Pigou AC (1932) The economics of welfare, 4th edn. Macmillan, London
Portmore DW (2007) Consequentializing moral theories. Pac Philos Q 88:39–73
Portmore DW (2009) Consequentializing. Philos Compass 4:329–347
Ramsey FP (1928) A mathematical theory of saving. Econ J 38(4):543–559
Ramsey FP (1931) Epilogue. In: Braithwaite RB, Ramsey FP (eds) The foundations of mathematics and
other logical essays. Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, pp 287–292
Rawls J (1971) A theory of justice. Belknap Press, Cambridge
Sen AK (1970) 2017 Collective choice and social welfare, Expanded edn. Penguin Books, London
Sidgwick H (1907) The methods of ethics. Macmillan, London
Sikora RI, Barry B (1978) (eds.) Obligations to future generations. Temple University Press, Philadelphia
Solow RM (1991) Sustainability: an economist’s perspective. The Eighteenth J. Seward Johnson Lecture,
Marine Policy Center, Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution
Solow R (2012) A few comments on ‘Sustainability and the Measurement of Wealth’. Environ Dev Econ
17(3):354–355
Stern NH (1977) Welfare weights and the elasticity of the marginal valuation of income. In: M. Artis and
R. Nobay (eds.) Proceedings of the AUTE edinburgh meeting of April 1976. Blackwell, Basil, ch. 8
Stern NH (2007) The economics of climate change: the Stern review. Cambridge University Press, Cam-
bridge
Stern NH (2008) The economics of climate change. Am Econ Rev 98(2):1–37
Stern NH (2014a) Ethics, equity and the economics of climate change. Paper 1: science and philosophy.
Econ Philos 30(3):397–444
Stern NH (2014b) Ethics, equity and the economics of climate change. Paper 2: economics and politics.
Econ Philos 30(3):445–501
Stern NH (2015) Why are we waiting? the logic, urgency, and promise of tackling climate change. MIT
Press, Cambridge
Suppes PC (1966) Some formal models of grading principles. Synthese 6:284–306
Tinbergen J (1957) Welfare economics and income distribution. Am Econ Rev Pap Proc 47(2):490–503
Vickrey WS (1945) Measuring marginal utility by reactions to risk. Econometrica 13(4):319–333
Vickrey WS (1960) Utility, strategy and social decision rules. Quart J Econ 74(4):507–535
Publisher’s Note Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps
and institutional affiliations.
123
